

## Reviews on Employment:

**1. Part-time employment, working conditions, health and gender in Europe: a systematic review**

**2. How and why employment protection legislation impacts on temporary employment: a realist review**



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# Part-time employment, working conditions, health and gender in Europe: a systematic review

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# Background

## Part-time employment (PTE)

- Increase in Europe, from 16,2% (2001) to 20,5% (2013)<sup>1</sup>:



- ✓ Work-family balance (**WFB**) strategy (primarily women)
- ✓ **Marginalization** strategy of workers (labor flexibility context)
- ✓ **Involuntary option** (economic crisis)

Ex: Spain (2002-2013): 20,5%-60.8% in women; 21,1%-70,1% in men<sup>2</sup>



- PTE, working and employment conditions and health status → heterogeneous results<sup>3</sup>

- ✓ **Country** differences (labor market and family policies)
- ✓ **Gender** differences (motivations for PTE)
- ✓ **Methodological** differences (definitions; measures; voluntary force...)



<sup>1</sup> EUROSTAT. European Commission. Statistics Database (2014). <sup>2</sup> EUROSTAT. European Commission. LSF series (2014). <sup>3</sup> Fagan C, et al. ILO. 2014

## Justification

- Expected to keep **increasing** next years, in Europe
- Concern about its **potential association** with **poor** employment and working **conditions** and **adverse health** effects

## Objective


1. To **summarize** the **scientific evidence** about **PTE, working** and **employment conditions** and **health status**, in Europe. Additionally, to **examine** the potential **reasons** of the **heterogeneous results**

# Methods (I)

- **Study design:** **systematic review** of observational studies (**PRISMA** guidelines)
- **Search strategy:**
  - ✓ Performed in **October 2014**
  - ✓ **4 Databases:** Medline (via PUBMED); Web of Knowledge; Scopus; JSTOR
  - ✓ Articles published between **Jan.2000- Dec.2013**, in **EU-27**
- **Inclusion criteria:**
  - ✓ PTE, working and/or employment conditions
  - ✓ PTE and health
  - ✓ Epidemiological study
  - ✓ Original article
  - ✓ In English
  - ✓ In indexed scientific journals
  - ✓ One or several EU-27 countries
- **Exclusion criteria:**
  - ✗ PTE and individual characteristics to perform it
  - ✗ Qualitative studies
  - ✗ Focusing on EU-27 and other countries but results not identified separately
- **2 teams (2 reviewers):** titles, abstracts and full-text articles (differences solved by the opposite team)
- **Quality appraisal:** index of **12 points** adapted from **STROBE** guidelines

# Methods (II)

Figure 1: Flow diagram of the number of records identified, included and excluded



# Results (I)

**Table 1a. Description of the papers included in the review**

		<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Year of publication</b>	2000-2007	11	35,5%
	2008-2013	20	64,5%
<b>No. of countries</b>	1	21	67,7%
	2 to 5	5	16,1%
	EU-15 (whole category)	3	9,7%
	20 EU countries (whole category)	1	3,2%
	EU-27 (whole category)	1	3,2%
<b>Study design</b>	Cross-sectional (CS)	20	64,5%
	Cohort study (COH)	10	32,3%
	Combination of CS+COH	1	3,2%
<b>Journal</b>	Health journals	14	45,2%
	Social Sciences journals	17	54,8%
<b>Risk of bias</b>	Low	16	51,6%
	Medium	15	48,4%
	High	0	0,0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>31</b>	<b>100,0%</b>

## Results (II)

**Table 1b. Description of the papers included in the review**


		<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Working and employment conditions (a)</b>	Job security	1	3,2%
	Promotion prospects	5	16,1%
	Earnings	4	12,9%
	Skill discretion & autonomy	1	3,2%
	Occupational downgrading	1	3,2%
	Social environment	1	3,2%
	Work-Family Balance	5	16,1%
<b>Health (a)</b>	General health status	6	19,4%
	Mental health	6	19,4%
	Job satisfaction	5	16,1%
	Other health outcomes	5	16,1%
<b>Included variables (control, interaction, mediator) (a)</b>	Countries	4	12,9%
	Women & men	22	71,0%
	Only women	6	19,4%
	Motherhood	18	58,1%
	Marital status	14	45,2%
	Voluntary/Involuntary PTE	3	9,7%
	Type of contract	10	32,3%
<b>Total</b>		<b>31</b>	<b>100,0%</b>

(a) Not exclusive categories



# Results (III): PTE, working and employment conditions

- **Higher job insecurity.** Both sexes (EU-15)<sup>4</sup>
- **Poorer promotion prospects.** Stronger in women (UK, Spain)<sup>5-9</sup>
- **Lower earnings.** Both sexes, most pronounced in women (UK, Germany, Spain)<sup>7,10-12</sup>
- **Less skill discretion and autonomy.** In women, but country-diff. (Sweden ,UK)<sup>13</sup>
- **Occupational downgrading.** High-skilled women switching to PTE (UK)<sup>14</sup>
- **Less consultation.** Stronger association in women (UK) <sup>5</sup>
- **Positive association with WFB.** Both sexes, stronger in women (Sweden, The Netherlands, UK, Germany, Portugal)<sup>15-19</sup>



<sup>4</sup> Burgoon B, et al. J Eur Soc Policy. 2010. <sup>5</sup> Hoque K, et al. Work Employ Soc. 2003. <sup>6</sup> Whittock M, et al. Sociol Health Illn.2002.

<sup>7</sup> Laura H. Investig Econ. 2009. <sup>8</sup> Hoesli I, et al. Swiss Med Wkly.2013. <sup>9</sup> McIntosh B, et al. Gend. Manag. An Int. J.2012. <sup>10</sup> Connolly S, et al. Oxf. Econ. Pap. 2009.

<sup>11</sup> Giesecke J. Eur Sociol Rev.2009. <sup>12</sup> Mumford K., et al. Oxf. Econ Pap. 2009. <sup>13</sup> Halldén K. Res Soc Stratif Mobil. 2012. <sup>14</sup> Connolly S. Eco J. 2008.

<sup>15</sup> Beham B. et al. Int J Hum Resour Manag. 2012. <sup>16</sup> Jansen N, et al. Scan J Work Environ Health. 2004. <sup>17</sup> Peters P, et al. Community Work Fam. 2009

<sup>18</sup> Russel H, et al. Work Organ. 2009. <sup>19</sup> Van Rijswijk K, et al. J Occup Health Psychol.2004

# Results (IV): PTE and health

## Health status:

- **Poor results** in Continental countries; **Protective** in UK. Among women<sup>20</sup>
- **Better health status**. Swedish and Dutch mothers (small PTE (< 24h/week))<sup>21,22</sup>

## Mental Health:

- **Worse mental health**. Women in temporary PTE (UK)<sup>23</sup>
- **Depression**. Both sexes in involuntary PTE (France)<sup>24</sup>
- **Less stress and anxiety**. Partnered mothers (UK, Sweden, Germany)<sup>23,25</sup>

## Job satisfaction:

- **More satisfaction**. Women in voluntary, small PTE (UK, The Netherlands)<sup>26,27</sup>
- **Higher dissatisfaction**. Both sexes in temporary PTE (EU-15)<sup>28</sup>

## Other health outcomes:

- **Better health indicators** than FTE (EU-15). No gender differences<sup>28</sup>
- **Less sleep problems and fatigue** (Sweden). **More well-being** (The Netherlands).  
Among mothers <sup>19,21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Van Rijswijk K, et al. J Occup. Health Psychol. 2004. <sup>20</sup> Artazcoz L, et al. Eur J Public Health 2013. <sup>21</sup> Floredus B, et al. Women Health. 2008.

<sup>22</sup> Fokkema T. Soc Sci Med. 2002. <sup>23</sup> Bardasi E, et al. Soc sci Med. 2003. <sup>24</sup> Santin G, et al. Am J Ind Med. 2003. <sup>25</sup> Seibt R, et al. Int Arch Occup Environ Health. 2012.


<sup>26</sup> Booth AL, et al. J Popul Econ. 2013. <sup>27</sup> Booth AL, et al. Econ J. 2008. <sup>28</sup> Benach J, et al. Eur J Public Health. 2004.

# Discussion (I): PTE, working and employment conditions

## Association with bad job quality (not for WFB)


### Country differences:

- PTE “retention/**integration** strategy” (Sweden, The Netherlands):
  - ✓ Good job quality; State caring services
- PTE “**marginalization** strategy” (UK, Germany, Spain):
  - ✓ Precarious conditions; Hardly inexistent state caring services
- PTE **definitions** and **measures**
  - ✓ Lack of an international definition difficult comparisons



### Gender differences:

- PTE **penalties** most pronounced in **women**:
  - ✓ Prevalence in feminized occupations
  - ✓ Marginalization in male's professions
  - ✓ With motherhood, penalties increase
  - ✓ Preferences constraints: availability of caring services or FTE hours



## Discussion (II): PTE and health

Differences between **gender**, the **voluntary nature** and **type of contract**:

**Poor mental health. Both sexes in involuntary PTE** (France, UK)

- Higher job insecurity perception (job quality, contractual arrangement)

**Better health outcomes. Mothers in voluntary, permanent short PTE** (UK, Sweden, The Netherlands)

- WFB mediating role between PTE and mother's wellbeing

**Lower job satisfaction. Men in PTE** (UK, The Netherlands)

- Holding involuntary PTE (ill-health/not in FTE due to crisis)
- Deviation of their expected gender role



# Strengths and limitations

## Strengths

- ✓ First review attempting to summarize the heterogeneous results on PTE, employment, working conditions and health status, in Europe
- ✓ Combination of databases (Social and Health Sciences)
- ✓ Articles assessed by two teams of two reviewers each one

## Limitations

- X Other information not collected by the search strategy (coverage datasets)
- X Language and publication bias
- X Most articles focused in one EU-27 countries. Impossible to summarize results by EU welfare state typologies
- X No results for *work intensity* and *exposure to occupational hazards*

# Conclusions

- **PTE, working and employment cond. and health, in Europe depends on:**

- ✓ Welfare state typologies
- ✓ PTE definitions and measurement
- ✓ Gender
- ✓ Voluntary-Involuntary nature

**Good quality PTE jobs (Sweden; The Netherlands):**

- ✓ PTE desired option to WFB (mothers)
- ✓ No association with poor health results


**Poor quality PTE jobs (UK, Germany, Spain):**

- ✓ Prevalence of involuntary PTE
- ✓ Association with poor health outcomes (mental health), in both sexes



**Implications for policy-makers:**

- ✓ Gender equality promotion in labour market and family life
- ✓ Enhance quality of PTE jobs
- ✓ Extend equal treatment for PTE and FTE workers
- ✓ Efficient allocation of caring services





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# How and why employment protection legislation impacts on temporary employment: a realist review

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
## Background: employment protection legislation

- Employment protection legislation (EPL) is one of the **labour market policies**.
- Includes **three main components**:
  - Regulation on temporary forms of employment,
  - Protection of permanent workers against (individual) dismissal
  - Specific requirement for collective dismissals.
- The aim of the EPL is to **protect jobs and increase job stability**.
- EPL implementation **vary** by type of **welfare regime**: less strict in liberal countries, and most strict in South-European countries.
- A clearer tendency towards higher **deregulation** of the labour market is observable in the past years
- Temporary contracts have been used to get around **strict regulation** of regular contracts

**“What works, for whom, in what circumstances... and why”**

Realist reviews are a relatively new approach to synthesizing research that seeks an explanatory focus. At its core, realist reviews unpack the mechanism(s) of how and why complex interventions thrive or fail, in particular setting(s) (Pawson, 2005).

### From initial rough theory to refined theory



# Objective

The **aim** of this study is to produce a more nuanced and critical understanding on how and why EPL across different welfare state context increases or reduces temporary employment.

- Understand which **mechanisms** are acting between EPL and temporary employment.
- Which **contexts** facilitate (or not) the mechanisms occur.

## Justification

By making a Realist Review, this article represents the first study to unpack the causal mechanisms between EPL and temporary employment.

# Methods: Realist Review

## Methodological steps:

**Step 1:** Identifying the review **question**


**Step 2:** Formulating our **initial theory** and **mechanisms**

**Step 3:** **Searching** for primary studies

**Step 4:** **Selecting and appraising** study quality

**Step 5:** **Extracting** relevant data, **analyzing** and **synthesizing** the data

**Step 6:** **Refining** theory (iteratively as we analyze data)



## Step 1: Identifying the review question

**How and why employment protection legislation (EPL) impacts on temporary employment?**


Limitations:

Initially, we were interested in labour market reforms and their impact on precarious employment and health, but due to the limitations of literature, we had to refocus our final aim: EPL and temporary employment. The impact on health will be therefore indirectly.

## Step 2: Formulating our initial theory and mechanisms

Our initial theory is based on this conceptual framework:


Figure 2. Macro-structural framework of employment relations and health inequalities.



Source: Benach et al., 2014. Employment, Work and Health Inequalities: A Global Perspective

## Step 2: Formulating our initial theory and mechanisms

Our initial theory is based on this conceptual framework:






## Step 2: Formulating our initial theory and mechanisms

### Our initial CSMOs:

CONTEXT (C)	STRATEGIES (S)	MECHANISMS (M)	OUTCOME (O)
<b>Macrocontext:</b> Change on labour relations in 70-90 Economic downturn in 2007 + Flexibility: •↓ EPL permanent workers (PW) •↓ EPL temporary workers (TW) + Power of firms	<b>S1:</b> Decrease the firing cost for temporary workers  <b>S2:</b> Decrease the hiring cost for temporary workers  <b>S3:</b> Extent maximum number of temporary contracts  <b>S4:</b> New kind of contracts: on-call, daily... according to production  <b>S5:</b> Decrease hiring cost (easier and cheaper) for permanent workers	<b>M1:</b> employers dismiss more temporary workers.  <b>M2:</b> employers hire temporary workers with lower wages .  <b>M3:</b> employers do more consecutive temporary contracts instead of a permanent contract worker,.  <b>H4:</b> employers hire temporary workers using these shorter contracts (M4) giving more flexibility to the employer according to the production  <b>M5:</b> employers fire more permanent workers instead hire temporary workers.	Temporary contracts Temporary employment
<b>Mesocontext:</b> EPL: - Deregulation of temporary employment: ↓ EPL TW - Unprotection of permanent employment again dismissal: ↓ EPL PW			


## Step 2: Formulating our initial theory and mechanisms

### Diagram of our initial CSMOs (I):



## Step 2: Formulating our initial theory and mechanisms

Diagram of our initial CSMOs (II):



## Step 2: Formulating our initial theory and mechanisms

### Our initial hypothesis:

**H1:** A reduction of EPL for temporary workers (C1) through the ease of firing temporary workers (S1.1) promotes that there is an increase in this type of contract (temporary) (O1) because employers dismiss more temporary workers (M1).


**H2:** A reduction of EPL for temporary workers (C1) through the decrease of hiring temporary workers (S1.2) increase this type of contract (temporary) (O1) because employers hire temporary workers with lower wages (M2).

**H3:** A reduction of EPL for temporary workers (C1) through the extension of the maximum period of temporary contracts (S1.3) makes that employers do more consecutive temporary contracts (M3) instead of a permanent contract worker, producing and an increase in this type of temporary work (O1).

**H4:** Deregulation of temporary employment forms (C1) creating new types of temporary contracts (on-call, daily ...) (S1.4) makes employers hire temporary workers using these shorter contracts (M4) giving more flexibility to the employer according to the production and increasing temporary workers (O1)

**H5:** A lack of protection against dismissal of permanent workers (C2) through the reduction of redundancy requirements and an increasing of ease for dismissal decreasing costs (S2.1) makes that employers fire more permanent workers (M5) instead hire temporary workers (O1).

## Step 3, 4 and 5: Realist Review process




# Results

We grouped mechanisms we found in 4 **demi-regularities**:

1. Flexibility from employers
2. Authoritarianism and pressure of work behavior
3. Discrimination on salaries and other working conditions
4. Avoid the costs of permanent workers

# Results

## 1. Flexibility from employers




### Examples:

1. When permanent employment protection is stricter (C), we observe an increase in temporary employment at expenses of permanent employment (O) due to a reduction of hiring costs (E) in case of **a firm can freely choose the proportion of its employees under temporary contracts** (M) (Khan, 2007).
2. With an high EPL for permanent contracts and low EPL for temporary (C), employers use those contracts (temporary) (O) more as **a flexible device to adjust employment in the face of adverse shocks** (M) (Dolado, 2002).

# Results

## 2. Authoritarianism and pressure of work behavior




### Examples:

1. When employment protection legislation is less stringent than legislation for regular workers (C), firms may be encouraged to hire more workers on a temporary basis to increase workforce flexibility (O) because firms will have stronger incentives to hire more workers at the entry level (M) and **employ them for a limited period** (M), without giving them a regular position thereafter (Pierre, 2004).
2. If firing costs for permanent jobs are substantial (Strong EPL) (C), employers will be relatively reluctant to hire young workers into such jobs (O) because **their productivity is rather unknown due to their limited work history** (M) (Khan, 2007).



# Results

## 3. Discrimination on salaries and other working conditions




### Examples:

1. When the EPL for temporary workers is limited and there is no statutory minimum wage or the level is low (C), **allows employers to hire non- standard workers at lower cost** (M) leading to high rates of non-standard employment rate (O) (Lee, 2013).
2. With an increased dualism in the labour market (C) and a high wage-pressure on permanent contracts (C), employers hire temporary contracts (O) and **tend to 'under classify' temporary workers in the occupational categories probably to cut total labour costs** (M) (Dolado, 2002).

# Results


## 4. Avoid the costs of permanent workers



### Examples:

1. the higher the firing costs (strict EPL for permanent) (C), the lower the share of temporary jobs transformed into permanent jobs (O), because large firing costs (S) are an **incentive for employers to use temporary jobs in sequence rather than converting them to long-term contracts, which are subject to the firing costs (M)** (Cahuc, 2001).
2. The incidence of temporary employment rises (O) after enactment of reforms (C ) reducing restrictions on their use (S) or reforms raising the cost of firing workers from permanent jobs (E) ,because employers desires for flexibility (M) and **firms have the option to terminate substandard workers at low cost (M)** (Kahn, 2010).

# Results: Final framework



# Conclusions

- Labour market reforms decrease employment protection of temporary and permanent workers
- Firms take advantage of this lack of protection and deregulation
- Main mechanisms are: **flexibility, discrimination, costs , and authoritarianism**

# Limitations

- Precarious employment was limited to temporary employment due to the scarcity of literature
- Context and legislation of each country or welfare state is different. Not enough literature to capture different mechanisms in different contexts
- Unions and enforcement are also important for the mechanisms

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